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WATER AS A LOCATABLE MINERAL: THE HERESY
OF THE CHARLESTONE CASE
EARL M. HILL*

I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the impact of the decision in Charlestone
Stone Products, Inc. v. Andrus' upon the Mineral Location Law
of 18722 and upon western groundwater law. 3 Only that part of the
decision declaring water to be a mineral locatable under the Mineral
4
Location Law of 1872 is considered.
On November 28, 1977, while this article was in process of preparation, the Supreme Court announced that it had granted the Secretary of the Interior's petition for certiorari. 5 Thus, if the high Court
speedily decides the matter and reverses the holding of the ninth
circuit that water is a locatable mineral under the Mineral Location
Law of 1872, Charlestone will be relegated to history as the aberration
it is, and this article reduced to a muffled protest against that which
never happened.
II. PARALLEL DEVELOPMENT
WESTERN WATER LAW

OF THE MINING

LAWS AND

Between 1848 and 1866, there prevailed a total absence of federal
legislation governing mining and water rights on the public domain.
In this legal vacuum, the California miners, and those elsewhere in
the West who followed their example, established mining districts
and promulgated rules governing the acquisition, holding and exploi* Partner In firm of Hill, Cassas and deLipkau, Reno, Nevada; B.A., 1960, 14 .L.B.,
1961, J.D. 196S, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
1. 533 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1977).
2. Mineral Location Law of 1872 ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 23,
25-28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 37, 39, 40-42 (1971)).
3. See generally 5 CLARK, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 407-46 (1972).
4. The remainder of the decision concerning the overturning of rulings of administrative tribunals within the Department of Interior will not be discussed in this article. Any
issue in that portion of the opinion appears to have been rendered moot by the limited
scope of the Secretary's application for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States. See Brief for Petitioner at 2, 7 n.5, Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products, Inc.,
No. 77-380 (1977 term).
5. 98 S. Ct. 501 (1977). After this issue was in page proofs, the Supreme Court reversed the bolding of the ninth circuit. 46 U.S.L.W. 4561 (1978).
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tation of mineral deposits on the public domain.6 First in time,
first in right was the cornerstone of the miners' regulations; dis7
covery, followed by appropriation and development was essential to
the validity of a mining claim" and a later locator with an earlier
discovery will prevail over an earlier locator with a later discovery.'
Because water was indispensable to the extraction of minerals and
processing of ores, 10 application of the prior appropriation and beneficial use doctrines to water rights was both logical and natural."
Beginning in 1866, Congress undertook statutory codification of
the law of mining and the prior appropriation doctrine of western
water law, as developed by the settlers and miners in the western
states and territories.1 2 Section 9 of the Lode Law of 186613 provides
as follows:
Whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of
water for mining, agriculture, manufacturing, or other purposes have vested and accrued, and the same are recognized
and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and the decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such vested
rights shall be maintained and protected in the same....
Section 17 of the Placer Act of 187014 provides as follows:
"All patents granted, or homesteads, allowed, shall be subject to
any vested and accrued water rights .....
Section 5 of the 1866 Act ' provides as follows: "In all cases
lands valuable for minerals shall be reserved from sale, except as
otherwise expressly directed by law."
Section 1 of the Mineral Location Law of 187216 provides as
follows:
Except as otherwise provided, all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States, both surveyed
and unsurveyed, shall be free and open to exploration and
purchase, and the lands in which they are found to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States and those
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who have declared their intention to become such, under
regulations prescribed by law, and according to the local customs or rules of miners in the several mining districts, so
far as the same are applicable and not inconsistent with the
laws of the United States.
Despite the apparently broad sweep of the phrases "all valuable mineral deposits" in the 1872 Act and "lands valuable for minerals" in the 1866 Act, not every mineral is subject to location under
the mining laws. Coal17 has never been locatable, and since 1920
petroleum and certain other minerals have been withdrawn from
location and made leasable only." The Common Varieties Act 9
withdrew from location and made subject to disposition and sale
common varieties of sand, stone, gravel, pumice, pumicite, cinders
and petrified wood, such substances being "really building materials
and not minerals such as were contemplated to be handled under
' 20
the Mining Laws.

Within this framework, Interior Department regulations declare
as follows:
"Whatever is recognized as a mineral by the standard authorities,
whether metallic or other substance, when found in public lands in
quantity and quality sufficient to render the lands valuable on account
thereof, is treated as coming within the purview of the mining
laws."2 1 Yet, the Interior Department very early held that various
types of water deposits, such as mineral springs22 and hot springs, 2s
are not locatable. As recently as 1973, the water associated with a
geothermal steam resource was held not locatable.2 4
Meanwhile, the water rights provisions of the 1866 Act 5 and the
1870 Act2 6 remain intact. The effect of these Acts is to protect rights
acquired after as well as before 1866, and "approve and confirm the
policy of appropriation for a beneficial use, as recognized by local
rules and customs and the legislation and judicial decisions of the
arid-land states, as the test and measure of private rights in and
to the nonnavigable

waters on the public domain.

' 27

Continuing

17. 1 AMEItCAN LAW OF MINING § 2.711 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found. ed. 1977).
18. Act of Feb. 7. 1927, ch. 66, 44 Stat. 1057 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §, 281-87
(amended Supp. 1977)). Act of Apr. 17, 1926. ch. 15S, 44 Stat. 301 (codified at 30
§§ 271-76 (1971)
(.mendted
Supp. 1977)1. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, ch.
Stat. 437 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ l l-263 (1971)
(amended Supp. 1977)).
19. Commc
Varieties Act of 1955, eh. 375. 69 Stat. 367 (codified at 30 u.S.C. §
(1971).
20. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MININO § 2.7N (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found. ed. 1977).

21.

43 C.F.R. t3,S12.1

(1971)
U.SC.
S5, 41
611-15

(1 97,6).

22. Pagos.a Springs. I L.P. 562 (1',82).
23.
Morrill V. Marganret Mi11. Co.. 11 L.n. 562 (1891.
24. United States N. Union Oil Co.. 369 F. Supp. 12S9 (N.D. Colo. 1973), rev'd on other
.rounds, 549 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1977).
25 . 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-51 (1971).
26. 30 U.S.C. § 35. 36. :18. 47, 52 (1971).
27. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaer Portland Cement Co.. 295 U.S. 142, 155

(1935).
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congressional intent that rights to nonnavigable waters on the public
domain be regulated by state law is manifested by the Desert Land
Act of 1877.28 This Act conditioned the right to enter land upon bona
fide prior appropriation and beneficial use of water but did not curtail the power of the states to legislate; on the contrary, it left the
question of water rights on the public domain subject to the plenary
control of the respective states. 29
In summary, Congress, the Department of the Interior and the
courts have consistently made clear that water rights may not be
created by the mining laws and that rights to locatable minerals
and the lands in which those minerals are found must be predicated
upon the discovery of such minerals on the public domain. Until the
ninth circuit handed down Charlestone, no responsible member of
the mining community would have sought to acquire water rights
through location of mining claims on the public domain. And until
then, no locator would have supposed himself to have accomplished
discovery through the mere development of a water well within the
boundaries of his claim.
III. THE CHARLESTONE STONE CASE
The Charlestone case is a classic example of what George E.
Reeves had in mind when he observed as follows:
The law of discovery is being made on the fringes of the
mining industry. The rules of discovery are being developed,
for the most part, in contests involving sand and gravel and
other common varieties of minerals ....

Sometimes the Sec-

retary [of the Interior] does not seem to realize that the
rules he is developing
will be of general application in the
30
mining industry.

Charlestone is, to be sure, on the outer periphery of the mining industry, and Mr. Reeves' concern cannot be alleviated by the fact
that it is the ninth circuit, rather than the Secretary of the Interior,
which is engaged in the development of ill-considered rules. To eliminate any doubt of the common-place nature of the case, let us briefly
examine the history of Charlestone.
In 1942, Murphy and Pine located the Charlestone Placer Claims
28. Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-29
(1971).
29. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 155
(1935). However, the United States may reserve and appropriate both surface water
(whether navigable or nonnavigable) and groundwater, for use in any federal enclosure,
and in so doing need not comply with state law. United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 422 U.S. 1041, (1975) aff'd, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Nevada
ex rel. Shamberger v. United States. 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958).
30. Reeves, The Law of Discovery Since Coleman, 21 RoCKY MTN. L. INST. 415, 472
(1975).
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Nos. 1 to 22. Charlestone Stone Products, Inc., acquired the claims
in 1960. These claims embraced an extensive sand and gravel deposit
in southern Nevada, where they are accessible by road to the city of
Las Vegas and its suburbs. During the 1940s, material from the
claims had been extracted, sold and used in construction projects
in and around Las Vegas. After a period of inactivity during and immediately after World War II, the claims were reactivated in the
early 1950s. On July 23, 1955, the Common Varieties Act 3 1 came into
effect, withdrawing common varieties of such materials as sand and
gravel from location under the mining laws.
In 1965, the Secretary of the Interior initiated a claim contest,
attacking the validity of the Charlestone Placer Claims, alleging lack
of discovery of valuable mineral prior to the critical date; July 23,
1955. After a hearing, the administrative law judge declared all the
Charlestone Placer Claims except claims No. 9 and No. 10 to be invalid.3 2 On appeal (and cross-appeal by the government against the
holding of validity of the two claims), the Interior Board of Land
Appeals affirmed the ruling holding twenty of the claims invalid and
Claim No. 10 valid, but reversed the ruling holding Claim No. 9
valid. 83
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada reversed, holding Charlestone Placer Claims Nos. 1 to 16 valid and ordering that "access to Claim No. 22 . . . be permitted so that the
water produced from the well on that claim may be made available
34
to the operations on the valid cIaims."'
On appeal, the ninth circuit affirmed and further held that Charlestone Placer No. 22 was also valid.3 5 In reaching this conclusion,
the court of appeals reasoned that water may be classified as a
"mineral," that Congress has manifested no intention of excluding
water from the general category of minerals locatable under the
mining law (which it might have done, as with oil, gas, sand and
gravel), and that therefore water is locatable.
On November 28, 1977, the United States Supreme Court granted
the Secretary's petition for certiorari.38 The sole issue presented
for review is whether water is a locatable mineral under the Mineral
Location Law of 1872. 3
31. Common Varieties Act of 1955, ch. 375, 69 Stat. 367 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 611-15
(1971)).
32. United States v. Charlestone Stone Products, BLM Nevada 065729 A to Q (1970)
BLM Nevada 065721 A and B (1970).
33. United States v. Charlestone Stone Products, 9 I.B.L.A. 94 (1973).
34. Charlestone Stone Products Co., Inc. v. Morton, Civil No. LV-2039 BRT (D.C. Nev.
1974).
35. Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co., 554 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1977).
36. 98 S. Ct. 501 (1977).
37. 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 23, 25-28, 29, 30. 33, 34. 37, 39, 40-42 (1971).

370
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IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE DECISION: THE "HERESY"
The ninth circuit's holding that water is a locatable mineral
was gratuitous on the part of that court --neither party had briefed
or argued this issue.38 Unless and until that holding is overturned,
the potential impact on both mining law and western groundwater
law is considerable.

A. MINING LAW
The decision invites blatant and wholesale prostitution of the
mining law." By the Mineral Location Law of 1872, the discoverer
of a valuable deposit of a locatable mineral on the public domain
acquires the right to appropriate a substantial surface area embracing the discovery, to hold the location and to extract the mineral
without payment of rent or royalty, provided he devotes $100 of
labor or improvements to the claim each year. In addition, after
the claim has been improved to the extent of $500, he may demand
and receive a patent at the bargain price of $2.50 or $5.00 per acre,
depending on whether the location is lode or placer.4 0 In the case of
placers, a bona fide association of eight persons may locate placer

claims up to 160 acres in size,4'1 and there is no limit to the number
of placer claims such an association may locate.4 2 The misuse and
abuse by corporations and others of the association placer claim
laws to appropriate larger parcels of land than legally permissible
is a time honored but reprehensible practice.' 3 That this practice
38. See Brief for Petitioner at 6, Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co., Inc., cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 501 (1977).
39. This statement assumes that Congress has never intended that water be deemed a
locatable mineral vithin the meaning of thu Mineral Location Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§
22, 23, 25-2S, 29, 30, 33, 34, 37, 39, 40-42 (1971).
Before Charlestone, the courts and the Interior Department consistontly rejected
the contention that water is locatable. See United States v. Union Oil Co., 369 F.2d 1289
(N.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd on other gromuds, 549 t".2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1977); Robert L. Beery,
25 I.B.L.A. 287 (1976): United States v. Bienick, 14 I.B.L.A. 290 (1974); William A..
Chessman, 2 L.D. 774 (1883); Pagosa Springs, 1 L.D. 563 (1S82).
40. Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 286 (1920).
The Supreme Court in a single decision points out that mineral lands are Open to
acquisition by every citizen. upon conditions easily complied with, but that the government will exact a faithful compliance with the stated conditions. United States v. Iron
Silver Mining Co., 128 U.S. 673 (18S8).. The long-held policy of the Department of the
Interior to retain all possible land in federal ownership now finds expression in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, P.L. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744 (codified at
43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (Supp. 1977)). The Act also preserves tho Mineral Location Law
of 1872 together with rights of locators and claims thereunder. P,.L. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2762
(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (Supp. 1977)).
41. 30 U.S.C. §§ 35-36 (1971). For a discussion of pitfalls inherent in association plac-r
claims, especially "accommodation locations" by "dummy" locators, see Hill, Placer 31ining Clai'rs-Selected Problems and Suggested Solutions, 23 ROCKY MTN. MuII. L. INST.
385 (1977).
42. See United States v. Cal. Midway Oil Co., 259 F. 343 (D.C. Cal. 1919), affd, 263
U.S. 682 (1923); Riverside Sand & Cement Mfg. Co. v. Hardwick, 16 N.M. 479, 120 1'.
323 (1911).
43. See Chanslor-Camfield Midway Oil Co. v. United States, 266 F. 145 (9th Cir. 1920):
Cook v. Klonps, 164 F. 429 (9th Cir. 1908); United States v. Toole, 224 F. Supp. 440
(D. Mont. 1963): Centerville M. & IT. Co., 49 L.D. 508 (1923) : Morrison, MINING RIGHTS
ON THE PITRI,I' DOM.IAIN 262 (16th ed. DeSoto 1936).
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has seriously impaired the credibility of the mining industry is evident from the remarks of the Associate Director of the Bureau of
Land Management at an Institute of the Rocky Mountain Mineral
Law Foundation in Salt Lake City in 1965.
The times require that we have convincing proof that the
land preempted for mining use is mineral land and that the
claimant has made a valuable mineral discovery. We would
like assurance that he intends to devote the land to mining.
The $2.50 and $5.00 per acre price tags affixed in 1872 never
really expressed the true value of the land, but they came
much closer to doing so in 1872 than they do today. We have
pending applications to patent placer claims of 160 acres
each, which have a value exceeding $3,000 per acre for surface nonmineral development. Naturally, if the Mining Law
can be used to turn this kind of profit, a lot 44of people will
suddenly and temporarily become "miners."
If a placer location may be validated by the discovery of ground
water within its boundaries, the potential for profit is enormous, and
the Bureau may expect a deluge of applications to patent water
placers. The situation described by the Associate Director will be
greatly aggravated. Responsible mining companies, genuinely concerned about their credibility with regulatory agencies and their
public image, can only deplore the ninth circuit's decision in Charlestone and its carte blanche for prostitution of the mining law.
B. DISRUPTION OF WATER LAW
In addition to wreaking havoc with the mining law, the Charlestone case has great potential to disrupt western groundwater law.
By treating water as a "mineral" which, along with the lands in
which it is found, is subject to location and purchase under the
Mineral Location Law of 1872, the ninth circuit has opened a Pandora's box of deplorable consequences. In deciding Charlestone, that
court turned its back on congressional policy concerning water rights
and set the stage for destruction of state regulation of water rights
in the arid western states.
Prior to 1866, most federal legislation in the field of water rights
was limited to navigation and drainage, with little or nothing pertaining to other uses.4 5 In 1866, Congress formally recognized and
gave the force of law to local custom and usage of prior appropria44. Hockmuth, Government Administration and Attitudes in Content and Patent Proceedbngs, 10 ROCKY AITN. AhN. L. INST. 467, 488 (1965). See also Melich, Public La.d
a(id Mining Legislation,
17 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 31, 40 (1972).
45.
1 R. CLARK, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 5.2 (1972).
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tion in the law of water rights.4 6 The Desert Land Act of 187741

authorized citizens, upon payment of twenty-five cents per acre, to
enter tracts of desert lands not exceeding one-half section, by applying the land to irrigation within three years.4 8 The Act required as

follows:
That the right to the use of water [by the entryman] . . . shall depend upon bona fide prior appropriation;
and such right shall not exceed the amount of water actually appropriated, and necessarily used for the purpose of irrigation and reclamation; and all surplus water over and
above such actual appropriation and use, together with the
water of all lakes, rivers and other sources of water supply
upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain and
be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for
irrigation, mining
and manufacturing purposes subject to ex4
isting rights .

In construing the quoted statute, the United States Supreme Court
held as follows:
The fair construction of the provision now under review
is that Congress intended to establish the rule that for the
future the land should be patented separately; and that all
nonnavigable waters thereon should be reserved for the use
of the public under the laws of the states and territories
named. The words that the water of all sources of water
supply upon the public lands and not navigable "shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the
public" are not susceptible of any other contruction. The only
exception made is that in favor of existing rights; and the
only rule spoken of is that of appropriation. It is hard to
see how a more definite
intention to sever the land and water
50
could be evinced.

The Act of July 23, 195551 limited a claimant's right to
use the surface of unpatented mining claims located after
the effective date of the Act, but expressly provided that
nothing in the Act shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect or in anyway interfere with or modify the laws
of the States which lie wholly or in part westward of the
ninety-eighth meridian relating to the ownership, control, ap46. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 253, (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1971),
and 30 U.S.C. § 51 (1971)) ; Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 218, (codified at
30 U.S.C. § 52 (1971)). This recognition of water rights acquired under state and local
law operates prospectively as well as retrospectively, protecting rights obtained after
eractent of t',
statutes. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.,
295 U.S. 142 (1935).
47. Deserr Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 321-29 (1971)).
48. 43 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
49. Id.
50.. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 161
(1935) (emphasis in original).
51. Act of July 23, 1955, ch. 375, § 4, 69 Stat. 368 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 612 (1971))
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or surface water
propriation, use, and distribution of ground
2
within any unpatented mining claim.
Thus, the consistent intent of Congress, as manifested by its Acts
from 1866 to the present, is plainly evident; that the appropriation
of nonnavigable sources of water be regulated under state law. The
states of the arid and semi-arid West have been under great pressure
to adopt conservation measures calculated to maximize public benefit from their scarce and limited water resources. A ground water
aquifer, unlike the typical ore body, is within limits a renewable
resource. The natural hydrologic cycle will replenish the supply provided withdrawals do not exceed the average annual recharge or
safe yield.5 3 To protect prior appropriators, state legislation may
provide for restriction of withdrawals to conform to priority rights.5
In some states, for example, Arizona,5 5 the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation does not apply to groundwater, but appropriations are
limited by the Doctrine of Correlative Rights, or as it is sometimes
called, the Doctrine of Reasonable Use.56 Regardless of which doctrine is applied, regulation of water use to prevent overdraft of an
aquifer requires the determination of average recharge or safe yield
and the limiting of withdrawals to that level. Such a determination involves the examination of numerous complex factors,5 7 but the fundamental fact remains clear that ground water aquifers do not constitute
an inexhaustible supply. The practice of aquifer overdraft (or ground
water "mining" as it is sometimes termed) ,8 is controversial, and
despite policies in Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Utah
to limit overdraft, it continues to occur in those states as well as in
Arizona, California and Texas where the Correlative Rights Doctrine
is in effect.5 9 Noteworthy in the present context is the fact that all
these states have adopted legislation designed to alleviate the problem.60 The ninth circuit's decision in Charlestone, if allowed to stand,
may well frustrate these efforts and emasculate much of the ground
water law of the Western States.
If, as the Ninth Circuit states, water is a mineral locatable under
52. Id.
53. Bagley, Water Rights and Public Policies Relating to Ground Water "Mining" in
the Southwestern States, 4 J. LAW. & ECON. 144, 166 (1961).
54. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.110(6),(7) (1973).
55. See Southwest Eng'r Co v. Ernst, 79 Ariz. 403, 291 P.2d 764 (1955).
56. Id.
57. McGuiness, Water Law with Special Reference to Ground Water, UNITED STATES
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR 117

(1951).

58. Bagley, supra note 53; McGuiness, supra note 57. See Fundingsland v. Colo. Ground
Water Comm'n, 171 Colo. 487, 468 P.2d 835 (1970).
59. McGuiness, supra note 57.
60. See ARM. REV. STAT. § 45-313 (1956) ; CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1005.1 to 1005.4 (West
Supp. 1977)) ; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-102 to 37-90-14.1 (1973) ; N.M. STAT. ANN.
§
75-11-3 (Supp. 1975) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1020.1 to 1020.22 (West Supp. 1977) ; TEx.
WATER CODE ANN. tit. 4 §§ 52.021, 52.108, 52.117 (Vernon Supp. 1976) ; UTAH CODE AN.

1 73-5-1

(1968).
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the Mineral Location Law of 1872, a "miner" is free to install wells
on the public domain, and totally deplete the "mineral deposit"
(ground water aquifer) with smug impunity against state laws regulating water appropriation and use. Surely, this result flagrantly
contravenes public policy enunciated by both the Federal and State
6
legislatures, and flies in the face of public interests. '
V. CONCLUSION
The devastating effects of Charlestone as decided by the ninth
circuit, upon both the mining laws and western water law, are clearly
apparent. The decision invites abuse and misuse of the mining laws
and is well calculated to create utter chaos in the water law.
Hopefully, the Supreme Court will recognize Charlestone for the
aberration it is, and reverse.

61.

Sce 5 R. CLARK, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS ! 446 (1972).
In the West, where land is relatively abundant, and where water is critica'.ly short, should it be the public policy of any state to adopt a rule of
law which will give the land owner an absolute right to develop his land
without any liability for destroying the percolating waters which are necessary tpo a valid appropriated right? The question answers itself. There should
be no such policy.
. Nor, it is submitted, should the federal courts adopt such a policy in the
face of contrary legislation.

